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New Economy, Old Biases
Nancy Leong

†

INTRODUCTION
Alan David Freeman’s seminal article, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti1
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,” provided a
pathbreaking account of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The article laid bare a striking contradiction. The law promised racial
equality, and indeed communicated that we had achieved such
equality. Yet the actual circumstances in which non-white people lived, worked, and attended school were in no way equal to
the circumstances enjoyed by white people. In short, the law
guaranteed equality while simultaneously rationalizing the ongoing existence of grievous inequality.
According to Professor Freeman’s penetrating analysis, the
law accomplished this rationalization in two ways. First, it
promised formal equality. Second, it ignored structural inequality and disparities not obviously traceable to individual bad actors. As a result, the law provided a weak remedy for discrimination. Sometimes it provided no remedy at all.
This Symposium Article will point out a related feature of
antidiscrimination law that restricts equality despite the
Court’s superficial dedication to equality. In keeping with Professor Freeman’s work, my task is mostly descriptive, with a
gesture at how we might improve upon the status quo. I first
† Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I am
grateful to Mario Barnes, Bob Chang, Jessica Clarke, Charlotte Garden, Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Justin Pidot, the other participants in the Symposium
commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Minnesota Law Review, and the
editors of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Barbara Marchevsky, Rajin
Olson, Emily Scholtes, Mary Scott, Christina Squiers, Taylor Stippel, Leah
Tabbert, and Eleanor Wood. Copyright © 2016 by Nancy Leong.
1. Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049 (1978).
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recount antidiscrimination law’s inattention to the private—
and, at times, its explicit prioritization of a private “right” to
discriminate over antidiscrimination values such as equality
and dignity.
The consequences of private discrimination are perhaps
felt with most strength in the marketplace. Here, Congress has,
in fact, provided a number of statutory mechanisms that could
2
be used to combat private discrimination. Yet the Court has
largely refused to acknowledge and remedy private discrimination that suppresses racial minorities’ participation in the marketplace. This inattention has extended conditions of economic
inequality and the problems that attend them.
On that note, I turn to a pressing issue of private discrimination today. Many have heralded the so-called “sharing economy,” which includes online or app-driven businesses such as
Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and Postmates, as a means to
3
reduce discrimination. After all, some argue, it is difficult for a
business to discriminate against someone on the basis of race
when the parties are in different locations rather than face to
face. But as I will show, certain features specific to the sharing
economy actually increase the potential racial discrimination,
both in a one-off encounter and over time. After enumerating
the social science research supporting the existence and persistence of discrimination in the sharing economy, I briefly consider how various legal mechanisms might be reinterpreted to
provide constructive solutions.
I. THE FAILINGS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
“[A]s surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination,
it has affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have
their children in all-black, poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little political

2. See infra Part II (examining federal statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (housing); and several Titles of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, including Title II (public accommodations), Title VI (funding), and
Title VII (employment)).
3. This list is fluid and evolving. Businesses come and go quickly in the
sharing economy. One such business, Homejoy, received a great deal of media
attention before abruptly going out of business. See Ellen Huet, What Really
Killed Homejoy? It Couldn’t Hold on to Its Customers, FORBES (July 23, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy
-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers.
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power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law.” So
wrote Alan David Freeman in 1978.
Since the publication of his seminal article, “Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,” unfortunately too
little has changed. When Professor Freeman wrote that “black
children today have neither an affirmative right to receive an
integrated education nor a right to equality of resources for
5
their schools,” he could have been talking about the Supreme
6
Court’s decision in Seattle School District No. 1. When he explained that people can “evade responsibility for ostensibly discriminatory conduct by showing that the action was taken for a
7
good reason, or for no reason at all,” he could have been speaking about the discourse of police blamelessness for the deaths of
8
black men and women that the Black Lives Matter movement
today struggles to address. And when he lamented the “political
9
powerlessness” of black people, he could have been talking
about a Fourth Amendment so emaciated that it now allows police officers to pull over suspects based on race without commit10
ting an “unreasonable” search or seizure.
In short, Professor Freeman provided a pathbreaking account of Supreme Court doctrine that—sadly—remains apt in
many ways today. The article showed that, by ignoring structural inequality and disparities not obviously traceable to individual bad actors, the law provides a weak remedy for discrimination. And the Court is not alone in its refusal to
acknowledge the lived realities of racial inequality. As many
scholars have noted, the cheerful narrative of success in achiev-

4. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1050.
5. Id. at 1068.
6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (invalidating two public school student apportionment plans
that utilized race as a factor).
7. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1055 (footnote omitted).
8. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://www.blacklivesmatter.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (providing news related to Black Lives Matter, a chapterbased national organization dedicated to combatting anti-black racism).
9. Freeman, supra note 1, at 1080.
10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (acknowledging
that “the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race,” but nevertheless stating that “[s]ubjective intentions
[of police officers] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis”).
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ing formal equality presents a stark contrast to the entrenched
11
racial inequality that remains to this day.
II. PRIVATE FICTIONS
Professor Freeman’s critique of the structural dimension of
racial subordination extends readily to private discrimination.
He says that formal equality will not produce equality on the
ground. I agree, and say that, moreover, governmental efforts
to produce equality on the ground will fall short unless they
strive to reach the private sector and do so effectively. Creating
lived equality requires the participation not only of the government, but also of the individuals it governs.
Other critical legal theorists have observed that the distinction between public and private is in many ways illusory, or
12
at least much less distinct than some would have us believe.
But even if the distinction between public and private were not
intractably blurry, the effect of private discrimination shows
that we cannot have a society that is equal along racial lines if
the law is inattentive to private actors.
The Supreme Court’s record is decidedly mixed when it
comes to regulating private behavior as a precursor to creating
13
conditions of equality. In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court
held that in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Congress exceeded its
power under the Fourteenth Amendment when it stated that
“[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the [public] accommodations . . . subject only to the conditions . . . applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previ14
ous condition of servitude.” But it later held, in Heart of At15
16
lanta Motel v. United States and Katzenbaugh v. McClung,
11. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow
the Course of Race Antidiscrimination Law?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015)
(noting that, while “formal equality” is achieved through race antidiscrimination laws, “discrimination and inequality persist”).
12. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351–53 (1982); Paul Starr,
The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 7 (1988).
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. Id. at 9 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3). For a discussion of the
Court’s decision, see RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 2–4 (2001).
15. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
16. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

2016]

NEW ECONOMY, OLD BIASES

2157

that the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to regulate race
17
discrimination by private actors, and three concurrences in
the cases explored the possibility that the Fourteenth Amend18
ment did as well. In short, the Court has at times understood
the importance of reaching private behavior as a precondition
to equality and has at other times has looked the other way.
Congressional history tells a similar story. As early as the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, Congress attempted to reach private
conduct, although as noted above for many decades that effort
was limited by the Supreme Court. With the Reconstructionera civil rights statutes, Congress provided a remedy for discrimination in contracts on the basis of race as well as for race19
based discrimination in housing. Several portions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also reach and prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race by private actors. Title II forbids discrimina20
tion in places of “public accommodation.” Title VI prohibits
21
discrimination by entities that accept federal funds. And Title
22
VII outlaws discrimination in the workplace.
One noteworthy feature of such laws is that they do not all
incorporate the intent requirement that the Supreme Court
23
read into the Equal Protection Clause in Washington v. Davis.
For some laws, courts have read in a similar requirement—for
example, “the vast majority of courts” has held that 42 U.S.C.
24
§ 1981 requires a showing of intentional discrimination. But
25
for those statutes that do not, such as Title VII, the party as17. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 262; McClung, 379 U.S. at
304–05.
18. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., concurring);
id. at 279–83 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 292–93 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also CORTNER, supra note 14, at 179.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012) (housing). In my view both statutes are highly underutilized by plaintiff’s attorneys,
who could press upon the boundaries of conduct prohibited by the statutes.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–2000d-7.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
23. 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). Washington v. Davis involved the equal
protection “component” of the Fifth Amendment. Its holding was reaffirmed in
the context of a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264–66 (1977).
24. Glenn B. Manishin, Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or
Disproportionate Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 137, 138 (1980). For a discussion
of the path that courts have taken, see id. at 137, 138–40, 138 n.11, 139
nn.12–14 .
25. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (holding
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serting racial discrimination need not show the existence of a
bad actor—a perspective that Professor Freeman lamented in
26
his work —and instead must only show that the discrimination
27
in fact occurred. On a superficial level, this is certainly an improvement upon the statutes for which courts have required a
showing of discriminatory intent, although so many other factors lead to tepid enforcement that the consequences on the
ground for the private sector have not been as robust as one
might otherwise hope.
Despite these efforts at implementing substantive equality
within the private sector as well as the public, and the hopes
that many advocates and scholars placed upon the statutes de28
signed to reach the private sector, and even the views expressed by some that the laws have in fact instantiated actual
29
on-the-ground equality, the law has fallen short in many
ways. Samuel Bagenstos notes that a zealous concern for individual liberty has limited the effect of public accommodations
30
statutes such as Title II. Anne-Marie Harris describes how
despite 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s explicit protection of minority shop31
pers’ “right to contract on the same terms as white shoppers,”
that Title VII did not require a showing of intentional discrimination). Washington v. Davis left the Griggs rule undisturbed. See Washington, 426 U.S. at
239.
26. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 1052–57.
27. There are, of course, differences among individual statutes. Moreover,
we should remain mindful that each state also has various civil rights statutes
in addition to the federal regime; these, too, sometimes hinge on particular
mental states.
28. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Comment, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 603–04 (1988).
29. See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996) (asserting that
there is a “settled social consensus” that public accommodations cannot exclude patrons on the basis of race); see also Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for
Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 156, 159 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (“Although Title II was
probably the most talked about section of the Civil Rights Act, the section
about which emotions ran highest, the section over which the most blood had
been spilled, it quickly faded in significance.”).
30. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to
Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2014) (“Since the
Reconstruction era, continuing through the civil rights era to today, public accommodations laws have triggered legal controversy over the extent to which
antidiscrimination principles should penetrate into spaces that had at one
time been understood as ‘private’ or ‘social.’”).
31. Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 1, 47
(2003).
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courts have failed to interpret the statute to prohibit even clear
32
cut cases of consumer racial profiling, while Jeremy Bayless
and Sophie Wang consider how the same issue inhibits enforcement of Title II’s prohibition on discrimination in public
33
accommodations. Scholars have provided many other such ex34
amples. So even though we have statutes on the books that
reach private racial discrimination, courts interpret those statutes parsimoniously and private actors accordingly face no consequences for behavior that in fact results in discrimination
and, unsurprisingly, fail to alter their behavior.
The dissonance Professor Freeman points out between the
law’s claim of equality and the actual felt effects of discrimination exists with equal force in the private sector. Section 1982
forbids housing discrimination, yet the foreclosure crisis of
35
2010 disproportionately decimated poor black communities,
and 70% of black people in the city of Chicago still live in nearly all-black neighborhoods—a number that dropped only nine
36
percentage points between 1990 and 2010. Title II forbids discrimination by places of “public accommodation,” defined broadly as “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests . . . any restaurant, cafeteria,
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility . . .
any gasoline station . . . any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or
entertainment” and other establishments that affect interstate
32. See id. at 55–56 (“Section 1981 currently protects consumers when
merchants deny them access to their premises. Plaintiffs whose allegations fall
short of complete denial of access, however, are usually unable to obtain compensation under the statute.”).
33. See Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A
Survey of Federal and State Anti-discrimination Public Accommodation Laws,
2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 288, 288 (2011) (explaining the statutory protections offered to protect minorities in retail stores and noting that Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides no protection to shoppers in retail establishments).
34. See, e.g., Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress:
Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1207, 1214–16 (1997) (discussing the persistence of discrimination in public
accommodations); Abby Morrow Richardson, Note, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981
to Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 199
(2005) (exploring judicial interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in cases involving
discrimination in the context of consumer retail contracts).
35. See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 630 (2010).
36. Dan Keating, Why Whites Don’t Understand Black Segregation, WASH.
POST (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/
2014/11/21/why-whites-dont-understand-black-segregation.
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37

commerce. Yet despite the sweeping language of Title II,
many people of color still struggle to hail taxis and face hostili38
ty in restaurants. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, yet workplace inequality remains: courts remain resistant to claims of discrimination on the basis of functional
39
proxies for racial identity such as attire, accent, and hairstyle.
The list could go on.
In light of this duality—facial equality and functional inequality—it is tempting to hope that non-legal mechanisms will
provide a solution. Some people have hung their hopes on the
sharing economy.
III. THE NEW PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
Much has been written over the past few years about the
“sharing economy.” While there is no single authoritative definition of that economy, a definition cited with some frequency
is that the sharing economy is a “socio-economic ecosystem”
built around the shared creation, production, distribution,
trade, and consumption of goods and services, that offers new
ways of filling human needs as basic as housing and transpor40
tation. The success of businesses such as Uber and Lyft, which
provide car services, or Airbnb, which offers housing rentals,
shows how the sharing economy can make our lives easier and
more efficient. One estimate predicts that the sharing economy
will grow from $15 billion annual global revenue in 2013 to
41
$335 billion in 2025.
Some people have hailed the sharing economy as a cure for
42
race discrimination in the marketplace —and in some instanc37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)–(c) (2012).
38. See Dan Harris & Gitika Ahuja, Race for a Cab: When Hailing a Ride
Isn’t So Black and White, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.abcnews
.go.com/GMA/race-cab-hailing-ride-black-white/story?id=7223511.
39. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1259, 1297–98 (2000); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1134, 1145–46 (2004).
40. Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO
SHARE, http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
41. See John Hawksworth & Robert Vaughan, The Sharing Economy—
Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, PWC, http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/
megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the
-revenue-opportunity.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
42. See Latoya Peterson, Cab Drivers, Uber, and the Costs of Racism,
RACIALICIOUS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.racialicious.com/2012/11/28/cab
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es it is. Latoya Peterson, noting longstanding discrimination
against black people in transportation, describes an experience
with Uber:
The price made me gag, but the rest of the experience was flawless: I
knew exactly when my car would arrive, I received a text when they
reached my location, I gave them a location without quibbling, and
43
rode there in peace.

The idea is that the Internet—by filtering out racial signifiers—will eliminate the possibility of discrimination arising
44
from overt or unconscious racism. An Uber driver who accepts
a request to pick up a black person is bound to do so, while a
taxi driver can simply drive past that person on the street. An
Airbnb landlord who rents out her property to a black person
over the Internet has obligated herself to complete the transaction, while a landlord who first meets a prospective tenant in
person may yet engage in discrimination.
In many situations, sharing economy mechanisms may
well improve upon their traditional analogues. But the mere
existence of the sharing economy is not a panacea for race discrimination. Rather, as we applaud the sharing economy’s
marketplace innovations, we should also work to ensure that
different yet equally problematic structures do not replicate
and perpetuate age-old discrimination that continues to plague
existing economic relationships.
Existing research raises real concerns as to whether sharing economy businesses ameliorate discrimination, or whether
45
they actually worsen it. For example, some research has found
that Airbnb—a company that allows property owners to make
housing available for vacation or other short-term rentals—has
been associated with facilitating both implicit and intentional
46
unregulated discrimination. One study, for example, found
-drivers-uber-and-the-costs-of-racism (stating that Uber “removes the racism
factor when you need a ride”).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations, 105
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author).
46. See Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The
Case of Airbnb.com 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Airbnb_92dd6086-6e46-4eaf
-9cea-60fe5ba3c596.pdf. Scholars have also noted the problem. See, e.g., Michael Todisco, Share and Share Alike? Considering Racial Discrimination in
the Nascent Room-Sharing Economy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 121–22
(2015), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/67_
Stan_L_Rev_Online_121_Todisco.pdf (noting that Airbnb provides hosts with
information about prospective guests that “serves as a heuristic for race,”
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that “non-black hosts are able to charge approximately 12%
more than black hosts, holding location, rental characteristics,
47
and quality constant.” Uber and Lyft have also both faced ac48
cusations of discrimination on the basis of race, as well as on
the basis of a proxy for race, by refusing to visit neighborhoods
49
populated predominantly by people of color. How can this
happen? Many sharing economy platforms offer opportunities
for participants to create profiles that may reveal their race
50
through a profile picture or a racially-coded name. As Michael
Todisco explains, “[b]efore accepting or denying any request,
Airbnb hosts are furnished with the guest’s first name, often a
51
picture, and other personal information.” Thus, sharing economy businesses may not, in fact, filter out the effect of race.
In addition to these instances of one-off discrimination,
sharing economy businesses also employ rating systems that
risk expression of implicit bias and even magnify its effects.
Rating systems therefore instantiate the same inequality long
52
present in the old economy.
An example will help to demonstrate the troubling effect of
ratings on the normal course of business in much of the sharing
economy. Consider Uber. Through a free, user-friendly smart
phone app, Uber “not only stores data about its passengers, but
also allows its drivers to rate passengers and makes the ratings
which gives hosts “a nearly unfettered ability to decline potential guests” on
the basis of race).
47. Edelman & Luca, supra note 46.
48. Xajaxsingerx, Ridesharing and Redlining: Uber, Lyft, Race and Class,
DAILY KOS (May 27, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/5/27/1302417/
-Ridesharing-and-Redlining-Uber-Lyft-Race-and-Class.
49. While not the focus of this brief Article, discrimination on the basis of
categories other than race is also possible: both Uber and Lyft have faced lawsuits for failure to provide services to the blind, disabled, and elderly. See Jen
Wieczner, Why the Disabled Are Suing Uber and Lyft, FORTUNE (May 22,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/22/uber-lyft-disabled; Lucy Zemljic, RideSharing Firms Uber & Lyft Sued by 14 Connecticut Cab Companies, (May 24,
2014), http://www.lowestrates.com/news/ride-sharing-firms-uber-lyft-sued-14
-connecticut-cab-companies.
50. For a discussion of racially-coded names, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig
& Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and
Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 1283.
51. Todisco, supra note 45, at 122.
52. Leong and Belzer, supra note 45; see also Noah Zatz, Is Uber Wagging
the Dog With Its Moonlighting Drivers?, ONLABOR (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://onlabor.org/2016/02/01/is-uber-wagging-the-dog-with-its-moonlighting
-drivers/; Noah Zatz, Uber: A Platform for Discrimination, ONLABOR (Oct. 22,
2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/10/22/uber-a-platform-for-discrimination/.
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53

available to other drivers.” Yet this seemingly innocuous
business model potentially facilitates discrimination in several
ways.
Most obviously, drivers’ and passengers’ ratings of one another may be influenced by express or implicit racial bias. Such
bias may affect their interactions during individual encounters.
But the insidious potential of the app is that it aggregates
these ratings over many interactions. One possible result is
that when a driver considers whether to pick up a passenger he
may decide not to if she has a bad rating. Another possibility is
that a passenger may notice a driver’s poor rating, cancel a request for service, and try again in a few moments in the hopes
of getting picked up by someone else. If the driver and the passenger do end up in the same car, a marginal rating may prime
one or both individuals to perceive one another in negative
ways. For example, if a driver knows that a passenger has a
relatively low rating, he may be more inclined to interpret innocuous behavior (declining to remove headphones, disinclination to engage in small talk) as unfriendly and to punish the
passenger with a poor rating.
Throughout the interaction, the format of the app itself
prompts and amplifies discrimination. Passengers upload pho54
tos when they sign up for the service —although it is unclear
exactly how the photos are used, Uber’s website makes clear
that they might be provided to the driver. Moreover, the app
provides the driver and passenger with one another’s names,
55
which are often correlated with race. Even absent the prime of
a low rating, the prime of racially identifying information associated with the driver or passenger through the app may color
the subsequent interaction.
The fact that drivers for Uber or Lyft may be using this
rating information to decide whether or not to pick someone up
56
is concerning at best. And the lack of transparency creates a
greater concern: although it is possible to call and learn your
customer rating, the cause of the rating remains unclear.
True, some checks on such discrimination may “reduce racial profiling and destination bias”: Uber claims to require its
53. Nancy Leong, Uber, Privacy, and Discrimination, RIGHTSBLOG (Apr.
20, 2014), http://www.nancyleong.com/race-2/uber-privacy-discrimination.
54. See Update My Profile Photo, UBER, http://help.uber.com/h/15726fa5
-152f-468c-a42c-ad63315b58ef (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
55. Barnes and Onwuachi-Willig, supra, note 50.
56. See id.
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drivers to accept 90% of all requests, and Lyft drivers are unable to see the destination request until they have picked up the
57
passenger. But these tools are at best very crudely calibrated
to the entrenched problem of race discrimination.
Nevertheless, one concern is that the way that sharing
economy businesses use customer data can facilitate discrimi58
nation. For example, how is someone supposed to know
whether her Uber profile will be used by a driver to either intentionally or unconsciously discriminate against her, either in
deciding whether to pick her up or deciding what rating to
59
award her? Because such information is hidden from the public, the common assertion that sharing economy businesses are
less discriminatory is not actually subject to any sort of external verification.
Without more information and analysis on the ways these
ratings are being used in everyday business, it is difficult to
prove the exact effect of the rating systems. For that reason,
“[t]hese kinds of private scoring systems are prone to abuse if
companies don’t publicize them or make the ratings sufficiently
transparent,” especially when one does not have easy access to
one’s score or the ability to improve one’s score by learning
60
from experience. As Professor Tim Iglesias has explained: “If
the primary intention of Airbnb, Uber, Lyft and other new
companies is really to help people,” they should “incorporate as
nonprofits and state their public purposes clearly so that they
61
can be held accountable to them.” While ratings often make
potential customers’ decisions easier and establish a business’s
reputation, as the rating system stands now, the systems of
62
companies like Uber are susceptible to abuse.
57. Johana Bhuiyan, Uber and Lyft Position Themselves as Relief from
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If users demonstrated that such abuse took place, however,
several existing civil rights statutes should apply to Uber’s discrimination. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the company should be
found to have engaged in discrimination in making contracts.
63
Uber is almost certainly a public accommodation, and should
thus be subject to the reach of Title II. And if passengers also
discriminate against drivers with poorer ratings, Uber might
well be liable under Title VII for constructing a rating system
that facilitates such discrimination.
Whether these statutes will be applied in this manner to
the sharing economy, however, is also up for debate. The problem is less with the existing laws and more with the way that
courts apply them and the evidentiary hurdles that race discrimination plaintiffs must overcome before they are believed. I
think that Professor Freeman would have predicted as much.
CONCLUSION
What is to be done about discrimination in the age of the
sharing economy? First and most importantly, we must heed
Professor Freeman’s words, which remain timely across the
decades. We must beware of rationalization—of explaining
away disparate effects on members of different racial groups—
and of the false promise of facially neutral systems.
Professor Freeman is very hard on the existing law. So am
I. But there are solutions if we are willing to embrace them.
Perhaps most obviously, courts can interpret existing federal
civil rights statutes more boldly, bringing regulation of the private sector better in line with true equality rather than its
weaker formal cousin. There may also be a role for more robust
enforcement of state civil rights statutes regulating the private
sector. Many such statutes are written more expansively than
their federal analogs, and state courts may be more willing to
enforce those statutes aggressively. And with the new intrica63. While the issue is not settled in the courts, several commentators have
agreed that taxis are public accommodations, and Uber is closely analogous to
a taxi service. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action,
32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 605–06, 606 n.12 (1999) (“Since . . . Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it has been illegal for common carriers, including
taxis to discriminate on the basis of race.”); Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimination in “Everyday” Commercial Transactions: What Do We Know, What Do
We Need To Know, and How Can We Find Out?, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD
ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 70 (Michael Fix &
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998) (referring to “hailing a taxicab” as a “public
accommodation”).
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cies of the sharing economy, legislatures at both the state and
federal level should move proactively to address some of the potential problems I have described here. For example, as I de64
scribe in more detail elsewhere, statutes could require collection and public disclosure of racial usage data by sharing
economy businesses—not unlike the way the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires collection of such data
by employers to ensure compliance with Title VII. Such mandatory disclosure would serve multiple functions: it would make
clear when racial disparities exist; it would provide important
evidence in the event of litigation under existing statutes; and,
perhaps most importantly, it would provide sharing economy
businesses with an incentive to correct racial disparities rather
than face negative publicity in the wake of disclosures revealing such disparities.

64. See Leong and Belzer, supra note 45.

